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Abstract  – The purposes of this paper are twofold: first, it aims at critically 
evaluating the solvency criterion, pioneered by Hamilton and Flavin (1986), which 
is nowadays almost hegemonic in the analysis of public debt sustainability, and at 
illustrating alternative measures of sustainability grounded on the dynamic 
stability approach originated by Domar (1944); secondly, it looks at sustainability 
in EMU member countries, with particular attention given to the relations between 
sustainability and the design of fiscal rules. The results show that the 3% rule 
imposed by the Maastricht treaty can be justified as a sustainability requirement 
for an “average” EMU member country. At the same time, the dispersion around 
this average is quite substantial: this questions the viability of uniform deficit caps 
across EMU member countries. 
Keywords: public debt sustainability, dynamic analysis, solvency constraint, 
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0.  Introduction 
Public debt sustainability is an important issue in the current policy debate. 
This applies in particular to the countries belonging to the European Monetary 
Union (EMU), where the need to ensure fiscal sustainability was often invoked as a 
rationale for the fiscal rules set out in the Maastricht treaty and in the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP); see for instance Buiter et al., (1993), Canzoneri and Diba, 
(1999), Buti and Giudice, (2002). But what do we know about public debt 
sustainability in EMU countries? 
The evidence available so far for these countries is scarce and does not reach 
unambiguous conclusions; see Corsetti and Roubini (1991), Payne (1997), Artis and 
Marcellino (1998), Bravo and Silvestre (1999). Moreover, these results are 
exclusively grounded on empirical testing of the intertemporal budget constraint, 
also called solvency constraint, or NPG (No Ponzi Game1) condition. 
This paper provides fresh evidence on public debt sustainability in the EMU 
member countries using a different empirical approach, which goes back to Domar 
(1944), and identifies sustainability with the dynamic stability of the public 
debt/GDP ratio around a constant steady state. In fact, a critical analysis of the 
solvency criterion shows that it is questionable both on operational and theoretical 
grounds, as it leads to useless and inconsistent definitions of sustainability, and is 
of little or no help in the design of fiscal rules. This motivates our proposition of 
alternative sustainability indicators grounded on dynamic analysis. To illustrate 
this alternative approach we adopt two indicators, which take both the form of a 
sustainability “threshold”, i.e., a value of the public debt/GDP ratio above which 
the economic system is dynamically unstable. The first indicator was obtained by 
Zee (1988) using a neoclassical overlapping-generation model; the second one was 
derived by Bagnai (1995) from the stability conditions of the dynamic Keynesian 
model of Tobin and Buiter (1976). These indicators depend in a meaningful way on 
a restricted number of key macroeconomic parameters. Using estimates of these 
                                                  
1 After the “multilevel marketing” pioneer Carlo Ponzi (Parma, 1882; Rio de Janeiro, 
1949).   3
parameters we obtain empirical sustainability indicators for eight countries of the 
EMU area, observe their evolution over the last decade and analyze their 
implications for fiscal rules in the EMU (in particular, the well-known 3% rule). 
The remainder of the paper falls into five paragraphs. Paragraph 1 criticizes 
the approach to sustainability testing based on the intertemporal budget 
constraint. Paragraph 2 describes the sustainability thresholds derived by Zee 
(1988) in the neoclassical overlapping generation model. Paragraph 3 derives a 
Keynesian sustainability indicator by exploiting the stability conditions of the 
dynamic Keynesian model of Tobin and Buiter (1976). In paragraph 4 the two 
indicators are estimated for eight countries of the EMU area (the twelve member 
countries less Austria, Finland, Greece and Luxembourg2) and their evolution over 
the last decade is observed. Paragraph 5 draws the main conclusions. A detailed 
account of the data sources and calculations is available on http://bagnai.org. 
1.  Empirical Assessment of Sustainability: Solvency Constraint 
vs. Dynamic Stability 
In this paragraph we briefly expound some reasons of dissatisfaction with the 
sustainability definitions based on the solvency constraint. These criticisms 
motivate the interest for an alternative approach to public debt sustainability 
testing. 
In order to define the solvency constraint, let us express the government 


















where Bt is the real stock of bond issued by the government evaluated at the end of 
time t, yt is real GDP, r is the real interest rate on public debt prevailing between t-
1 and t,  n is the real rate of growth, and at is the primary surplus/GDP ratio 
                                                  
2 These countries were excluded due to lack of data. See the statistical appendix on 
http://bagnai.org.    4
(including seigniorage). We assume constant interest and growth rates in order to 
keep the notation as simple as possible. Although some authors dub equation (1) as 
“uniperiodal” or “static” budget constraint (see for instance Chalk and Hemming 
(2000)), this identity does simply express the fact that current expenditures 
(including the service of debt) can be financed by levying taxes and/or issuing new 
debt, and as such does not put any constraint whatever on the current or future 
value of public debt (see Haliassos and Tobin (1990)). 
This is best seen by leading identity (1), solving it with respect to the current 
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∑  (2) 
Since the debt/GDP ratio can in principle take any value in the limit, equation (2) 
clarifies that equation (1) does not constrain the current value of Bt/yt for any given 
path of at. 
The intertemporal budget constraint (or solvency constraint, or NPG) is set 















  +   =    +     
 (3) 
For the constraint (3) to be verified it suffices that Bt/yt does not grow at a 
rate exceeding (1+r)/(1+n) − 1 ≈ r − n; this happens when the service of the debt is 
not covered entirely by issuing new debt. If we rule out this perpetual rollover case 
(Ponzi game), equation (2) establishes that the current value of the debt is equal to 
the expected present value of the infinite stream of future surpluses, which means 
that when the constraint is in force the debt must eventually be repaid, i.e., that 
the government must realize in the future at least one primary surplus (if the 
current value of the debt stock is positive, there must be at least one positive value 
of at in the summation for the constraint to hold).   5
Starting from Hamilton and Flavin (1986), most recent empirical work on 
public debt sustainability defines sustainability as the respect of the intertemporal 
constraint (3). As stated before, we find that this definition is unsatisfactory on 
both operational and theoretical grounds. 
From the operational point of view, it is well known that the intertemporal 
budget constraint is respected even by paths of the public debt/GDP ratio that grow 
exponentially, provided their rate of growth is less than the spread between the 
real interest and the real growth rate (see equation (3) above). Needless to say, this 
is an extremely unpalatable conclusion. 
From the economic point of view, the most striking feature of the 
sustainability definition based on the intertemporal budget constraint is its 
internal inconsistency. The reasoning underlying this definition is as follows: if we 
observe somehow in the data a violation of the intertemporal budget constraint, 
this means that sooner or later the government will have to change its policies in 
order to meet the solvency requirements, hence, the current policies are not 
“sustainable”. This argument ignores that the NPG is not a bare fact of nature: 
rather, it is a constraint imposed on the behaviour of debtors by the rational 
behaviour of creditors in a well defined class of intertemporal equilibrium models. 
The solvency constraint stems from the fact that in these equilibrium models 
nobody wants to be the creditor of an insolvent debtor (i.e., nobody wants to hold a 
net creditor position in expected present value), and therefore nobody (be it the 
government or another economic agent) can be insolvent (i.e., nobody can find itself 
in a net debtor position).  
Therefore, if the model on which the constraint is based is true, 
“unsustainable” debt paths will never be observed (thus thwarting any possible 
empirical test). This is because, as stated before, the solvency constraint must be 
respected in equilibrium: therefore, observed violations of the constraint must be 
apparent and temporary, hence irrelevant as far as solvency (which is an 
asymptotic requirement, as shown by (3)) is concerned. In fact, if we were willing to 
admit for argument’s sake that the observed deviation were persistent, and   6
therefore that restoration of the equilibrium called actually for a structural change 
(as Wilcox (1989) appears to believe), it is unclear how rational agents could 
postpone it, thereby bearing the cost of a persistent deviation from their 
equilibrium path. This means that if we agree with the equilibrium approach on 
which it is grounded, the intertemporal budget constraint may appear to be violated 
only in those economies in which it is not binding (and therefore cannot be utilized 
to define sustainability), either because economic agents are irrational in some 
way, or because the structure of the economy does not request that a solvency 
constraint be respected in equilibrium, as it happens in dynamically inefficient 
economies, but also in dynamically efficient open economies (see for instance 
Persson, 1985), and in other cases of “rational Ponzi games” (see O’Connel and 
Zeldes, 1988). 
The argument developed so far in this paragraph is not new. On the contrary, 
it is precisely that followed by Hamilton and Flavin (1986) in their pioneering work 
on sustainability. For these authors the respect of the intertemporal budget 
constraint in the data means that this constraint is in force and that the public 
expects it to hold. Therefore, if the solvency constraint appears to be respected by 
the data and the government is running a policy of persistent primary deficits, 
then the government will have to reverse its policy sooner or later (i.e., this policy 
is unsustainable). In other words, the respect, not the violation, of the constraint is 
an indicator of the unsustainability of “Ponzi policies”. 
It is unclear why this argument, which is perfectly consistent with the 
neoclassical premises of the model underlying the constraint (3), was completely 
reversed by the subsequent work in this area, in favour of the inconsistent 
reasoning expounded above (initiated by Wilcox, 1989). This is probably due to the 
fact that the implications Hamilton and Flavin’s approach are “too much 
unpalatable”, because they lead to the Panglossian conclusion that the observed 
path of the public debt only explodes when it can safely explode without 
compromising the equilibrium of economic agents. Summing up, the intertemporal 
constraint approach leads to absurd conclusions when its application is   7
inconsistent with the underlying model, and to even more absurd conclusions when 
it is consistently applied. 
Fortunately, the intertemporal budget constraint is not the only analytical 
tool available for sustainability testing. A well established, although presently a bit 
underrated, strand of the literature identifies sustainability with the dynamic 
stability of the public debt/GDP ratio around a constant steady state (Domar 
(1944), Masson (1985), Tobin (1986), Spaventa (1987), Zee (1988), Blanchard et al. 
(1990), Pasinetti (1998), Heise (2002)). By ruling out explosive paths of the public 
debt/GDP ratio, this definition has a lot more intuitive appeal than the solvency 
requirement. Nevertheless, the dynamic stability approach was sometimes 
criticized because in its simplest form it implies that any constant path of the 
public debt/GDP ratio is sustainable. This is clearly an absurd proposition 
(although far more acceptable than the “ever exploding” debt paths allowed by the 
solvency requirement).  
However, if we leave the simple analysis of the public debt stock/flow identity 
(1) and consider more detailed models of the economy, including a representation of 
the crowding-out mechanism, we find that the dynamic stability conditions do 
generally depend on the size of the public debt/GDP ratio. This allows to define 
sustainability “thresholds” for the value of the public debt/GDP ratio, i.e., the 
values of this ratio beyond which the stability conditions are violated (and 
therefore every perturbation can set the economic system on a divergent debt 
spiral). In this case the sustainability definition based on dynamic stability gains a 
lot of intuitive appeal (besides being based on rigorous economic analysis): a 
sustainable public debt/GDP ratio is one that is constant and  below given 
thresholds. 
These thresholds depend in an economically meaningful way on some key 
parameters of the economic system. Moreover, they can be used to measure the 
evolution of sustainability over time, in relationship to the evolution of the 
macroeconomic framework as captured by these key parameters, and are therefore 
much more informative than the results of the so called “solvency” tests. These   8
tests, in fact, only say whether or not the public debt is “sustainable” today, 
without saying why it is so, and without indicating whether the evolution of the 
macroeconomic framework is likely to impair further or to restore sustainability. 
Of course, these thresholds are model specific, being based on the stability 
analysis of a given model. However, it should be clear from the above discussion 
that this limit is shared by the intertemporal constraint approach, which is also 
based on a specific class of models (although in a less transparent manner, which 
allows most authors to present it as an “atheoretical” requirement which does not 
need to be discussed). In this respect, the advantage of the dynamic stability 
approach is that the researcher explicitly chooses a model in which he believes (and 
can compare, if he wishes, the conclusions of this model with those of competing 
explanations of the world)! In this paper we present two different indicators, based 
respectively on a neoclassical and on a Keynesian model. Their derivation is 
discussed in the next two paragraphs, starting from the neoclassical indicator, and 
their application is illustrated in paragraph 4. 
2.  Sustainability Thresholds in a Neoclassical Overlapping 
Generations Model 
Zee (1988) applies to an overlapping generation model à la Diamond (1965) 
the definition of sustainability as dynamic stability of the debt/GDP ratio, thereby 
obtaining sustainability thresholds for the public debt. We describe briefly his 
model in order to introduce the notation that will be used in the empirical section 
of this paper. 
In Zee’s model the labour force, that expands at the exogenous rate n (which 
coincides with the real growth rate of the economy), is composed of individuals that 
live two periods. The representative agent works when young, earning the net real 
wage (1-τ)wt, where τ is the tax rate on income. The share st of lifetime income that 
is not consumed in the first period (the saving rate) is invested at the net rate of 
interest rt+1(1-τ), where rt+1 is the gross rate of return earned in t+1 for postponing 
a unit of consumption in t, in order to finance consumption when old. As usual, the   9
representative individual sets his lifetime consumption path (hence, the size of st), 
by maximizing a biperiodal utility function, given the factor rewards determined by 
standard neoclassical equilibrium in the supply side of the model. This standard 
model is augmented with a government sector, whose budget constraint, expressed 














 (4)   
where bt is public debt (consisting of one-period bonds paying the equilibrium rate 
of return), gt is current expenditure and xt is per capita output (hence, τxt is per 
capita income tax revenue). In other words, the government finances current 
expenditure and the service of debt by levying income taxes and issuing new debt. 
Equation (4), together with the asset market equilibrium condition, constitute a 
second order nonlinear difference equation system in bt and rt whose (local) 
stability conditions are obtained after linearization around the steady state. 
A necessary condition for stability in the model is that the difference equation 
(4) has a stable root, namely, that n> rt+1(1-τ). In the standard dynamic analysis of 
the burden of debt, which takes the interest rate as exogenous, equation (4) would 
be a constant coefficients linear equation and this condition would also be sufficient 
for the stability of bt. In Zee’s model, however, the interest rate cannot be taken as 
given, because any shift from tax to debt financing  crowds out physical capital and 
determines an increase in the real rate of interest. 
Zee shows that in the presence of crowding-out the sufficient conditions for 
dynamic stability are 
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δ  interest rate elasticity of saving 
ε<0  interest rate elasticity of investments 
η>0  income elasticity of consumption 
k  capital/output ratio 
ϕ  capital elasticity of output 
(all the variables are undated because they are evaluated at the steady state). 
Equation (5) defines a sustainability threshold b   for the public debt/output 
ratio  b/x ≡  B/y. If the debt exceeds this threshold, the economic system is 
dynamically unstable, and the debt will respond to any exogenous shock by turning 
into an explosive trajectory. 
The parameters in the above equations (5) and (6) are readily available and 
their economic meaning is transparent and can be easily traced back to the 
transmission mechanisms featuring in the model. A sensitivity analysis shows that 
the key parameters that influence the size of b   are n, r and τ. Their effects on the 
sustainability thresholds can be easily understood with reference to equation (4): 
an increase in n and τ will increase the threshold, while an increase in r will lower 
it. Moreover, the threshold increases linearly with the capital/output ratio (an 
economy with a larger capital stock can afford a larger stock of debt) and with the 
absolute values of the interest rate elasticities δ and ε (the more responsive are 
these flows to the interest rate, the smaller the increase of interest rate which is 
needed to restore the equilibrium between saving and investment after a shift from 
taxes to debt, hence the less impaired the system dynamic stability). 
When the biperiodal utility function is of the Cobb-Douglas type, the income 
elasticity of consumption is unit (η=1) and the interest elasticity of saving is zero (δ 
=0), so that equation (6) simplifies to   11









Since the parameter ϕ is multiplicated by δ, it also disappears from equation (6), 
leading to six the number of the parameters involved in the indicator (5). In the 
applications of (5) we will assume that both the utility and the production function 
are Cobb-Douglas. 3 
3.  Sustainability Thresholds in a Keynesian Model 
The dynamic Keynesian model proposed by Tobin and Buiter (1976, par. 4), 
building on the work of Blinder and Solow (1973), is obtained by augmenting a 
standard Keynesian model with the government budget identity; this identity, 
together with the investment function, builds up a second order nonlinear dynamic 
system that describes the evolution of the stocks of public debt and physical 
capital. The stability of the equilibrium depends on the fiscal and monetary policy 
rules. When the coefficient of monetization of the deficit is zero and public 
expenditure varies endogenously with the burden of debt, then a necessary 
condition for dynamic equilibrium is 






α    τ− −τ +α −τ + +     
>0 (7) 
where, in addition to the symbols already introduced, we have 
α  share of capital income on total income 
L  desired share of money in the consumers’ portfolio 
L1  first derivative of money demand w.r.t. the real interest rate 
w  wealth/output ratio 
                                                  
3 It should be noted that almost every piece of empirical work on the consumption 
function either finds or imposes a unit income elasticity, while the results on the interest 
elasticity of saving (or of consumption) are rather mixed. Therefore the implications of our 
simplifying assumption appear to be supported by the empirical evidence.     12
(all variables are evaluated at the steady-state).4 The stability condition (7) 







τ  − +α ψ+α  −τ  <≡ −  (8) 
where ψ = (1-τ)L1r/L < 0 is the net interest elasticity of money demand. 
The threshold (8) is directly proportional to τ and inversely proportional to r, 
as it is the threshold (5), and for basically the same reasons.5 Moreover, the 
threshold (8) is also directly proportional to the absolute value of ψ. This feature is 
related to the crowding-out mechanism represented in the model. When an 
expansionary fiscal policy  is financed by deficit, the interest rate needs to increase 
in order to induce the economic agent to reallocate their equilibrium portfolio from 
money to debt. The larger the responsiveness of money demand to the interest rate 
(as measured by the absolute value of ψ), the smaller the increase in r needed for 
restoring the portfolio equilibrium allocation. Therefore, a larger value of |ψ| means 
ceteris paribus a lower increase in r, with smaller effects on the burden of debt. 
It should be stressed that the stability condition (7), and therefore equation 
(8), is only a necessary condition: the necessary and sufficient conditions are met 
when equation (7) is satisfied together with two other inequalities, both depending 
on B/y. It can be shown that when the model parameters fall in a plausible range 
one among these two additional conditions is less restrictive than equation (7) (i.e., 
it is automatically satisfied if (7) holds), while the other can be more restrictive. 
                                                  
4  Equation (7) is obtained by substituting the equations (5), (8) and (12) of Tobin and 
Buiter (1976) in their equation (25). 
5 An anonymous  referee pointed out that the positive relation between the tax rate 
and the sustainability threshold is questionable, because economic agents are unwilling to 
accept “excessive” levels of taxation. In fact, the models from which the stability conditions 
are derived are quite stylized and their features do not allow us to give an empirical content 
to the concept of “excessive” taxation. However, in a more realistic setting, increasing 
taxation without restraints cannot be seen as a viable strategy for enhancing public debt 
sustainability.   13
However, equation (7) suits our needs, because we are interested in finding the 
values beyond which the debt determines the dynamic instability of the system 
(which are defined by the necessary conditions for stability). 
 









BEL -1.93 -4.67 1.02
DEU -0.23 1.94 0.65
ESP 0.41 -15.39 0.64
FRA -0.83 3.50 0.70
IRE 18.40 -12.67 0.32
ITA -0.32 1.38 1.20
NLD -0.48 -5.93 0.52
PRT 0.04 1.71 0.59
EMU -0.44 1.50 0.72
Table 1 – Sustainability indicators and current value of the public debt/GDP ratio 
for eight member countries and the EMU area. 
4.  Empirical Evidence for EMU countries 
In this section we evaluate the sustainability thresholds (5) and (8) using 
data from eight countries of the Euro area; we also evaluate the indicators using 
area-wide aggregate data for the EMU. Summing up, the parameters needed in 
order to calculate the neoclassical threshold (5), under the simplifying assumption 
of Cobb-Douglas utility and technology, are  six: ε, k, n, r, s and τ, while for the 
Keynesian threshold (8) we need only five parameters: α, r, τ, ψ and w. The two 
thresholds have two parameters in common: r and τ. Only two among the nine 
parameters required for the calculations need to be estimated by econometric 
methods: the interest elasticities of money demand, ψ, and investments, ε. The 
others can be constructed simply as ratios or growth rates of variables that are   14
easily found in the published national account statistics.6 This reduces the degree 
of arbitrariness in the evaluation of the indicators. 
4.1Sustainability in EMU member countries 
Table 1 reports the Keynesian and neoclassical sustainability indicators for 
the eleven countries considered and for the EMU, evaluated using the sample 
average of the parameters over the last thirty years (see the appendix for a detailed 
description of the calculations). A negative value of the indicator is clearly a signal 
of unsustainability, as it means that dynamic stability cannot be achieved for any 
positive value of the public debt/GDP ratio. As the two indicators are based on 
different models, we should not expect them to agree in their conclusions. However, 
in three out of nine cases, namely for Belgium, Spain, and the Netherlands, both 
indicators agree that public debt is unsustainable. In another case, Ireland, the 
neoclassical indicator is in favour of sustainability, while the Keynesian is not. On 
the contrary, in the remaining cases (Germany, France, Italy, Portugal, and the 
EMU area) the Keynesian indicator supports sustainability, while the neoclassical 
does not. Summing up, the neoclassical indicator gives a somewhat more 
pessimistic view, while the Keynesian indicator is less stringent. 
Table 2 compares these results with those of the most recent studies based on 
the solvency constraint. These studies do not always agree on their conclusions, 
with some exceptions: Germany (where sustainability is supported in three out of 
four studies), Belgium, Ireland, Italy and Portugal (where the public debt is 
generally found to be unsustainable). Since the Nineties have witnessed a great 
effort of fiscal retrenchment in most of the countries considered, differences in the 
results between the earliest and the latest applications of the solvency tests may 
well depend on differences in the sample considered (with the most recent tests 
being more favourable to solvency). 
 
                                                  
6 A detailed indication of the data sources is reported in the statistical appendix 
available on http://bagnai.org.    Sustainability indicators  Solvency constraint tests 
 


















BEL         NA   
DEU    *  *    *  * 
ESP     *    NA   
FRA    *        * 
IRE *        NA   
ITA    *         
NLD         NA * 
PRT    *  NA    NA   
EMU  *  NA  NA  NA  NA 
Table 2 – Empirical results on public debt sustainability in EMU member countries. A star indicates that the 
indicator/test is in favour of the sustainability of the public debt. 
 While the solvency constraint tests end up in a dichotomous   
answer (sustainable/unsustainable), the dynamic stability indicators 
are more informative. In particular, they allow the distance of a given 
country from unsustainability to be measured. For instance, while 
according to the Keynesian indicator both Germany and Italy have a 
sustainable debt level, it is easily verified that the Italian public debt is 
closer than the German one to “unsustainability”. On the other hand, 
although according to the neoclassical indicator the current level of debt 
is unsustainable in both Belgium and Portugal (a result on which the 
solvency tests are unanimous), it is apparent that Portugal (with a 










* f b = γ  
DEU 1.94 0.043 0.084
FRA 3.50 0.036 0.124
ITA 1.38 0.055 0.075
PRT 1.71 0.083 0.141
EMU 1.50 0.043 0.034
Table 3 – Deficit/GDP ceilings consistent with dynamic stability of the 
public debt/GDP ratio according to the Keynesian indicator. 
More generally, the results in Table 1 show large differences 
between EMU member countries as far as the dynamic stability of their 
public debt is concerned. This raises the issue of the opportunity of 
imposing on all these countries the same deficit/GDP ceilings, as 
envisaged by the Maastricht treaty and the SGP. Since the steady state 
levels of debt and deficit are related, we can easily derive from Table 1   17
deficit ceilings grounded on economic theory. For instance, using the 
continuous time approximation of the debt stock/flow identity   
bf b γ =−  , where a dot indicates the time derivative, f is the 
deficit/GDP ratio and γ the nominal growth rate, the long-run 
deficit/GDP ratio  f  consistent with a steady state debt/GDP ratio of b  
is equal to 
  f b = γ  (9) 
Using (9) and the sample average of γ in the post-Maastricht sample 
(1990-2003) we find for instance that in the countries where public debt 
is sustainable according to the Keynesian indicators the upper bounds 
of the deficit/GDP ratio consistent with dynamic stability are those 
reported in Table 3. An interesting finding of Table 3 is that the 
Keynesian indicator implies a 3.4% deficit ceiling for the aggregate 
EMU economy. Since area-wide aggregate parameters are in fact 
weighed averages of the corresponding country specific parameters, this 
result justifies the 3% deficit ceiling envisaged by the SGP in terms of 
dynamic stability of an “average” EMU member economy. However, the 
dispersion around this average is substantial, and in most cases 
(including Italy) the Keynesian sustainable deficit/GDP ratios are well 
above the 3% ceiling.7 
                                                  
7 An anonymous referee has observed that some ceilings evaluated in 
Table 3 are quite large and therefore can hardly be seen as sustainable in the 
long run. In fact, the sustainability thresholds are necessarily approximated 
and should be interpreted with caution, being derived from the linearization of 
very simple dynamic models. We believe nevertheless that they provide useful 
insights into the sustainability stance of the countries considered.    18
4.2 Cross-country comparisons 
Since the indicators depend on a restricted number of parameters, 
it is easy to compare the situation of different countries using “diamond” 
graphs where each parameter is plotted on a separate axis. The figures 
from 1 to 6 present such an analysis of the Keynesian indicator for a 
selected number of countries. The units of measurement are chosen in 
such a way that sustainability increases with the distance from the 
origin of the axes and scaled so that the origin coincides with the lowest 
value observed in the sample. Therefore, the real rate of interest r and 
the capital share on output α decrease with the distance from the origin 
(since lower values of these variables enhance sustainability, as results 
from Table 5), while the interest elasticity of money is taken in absolute 
value and increases with the distance from the origin. In other words, 
public debt is the less sustainable the more the “diamond” graph 
collapses toward the origin. This allows for quick comparisons between 
the sustainability positions of different countries. In Figures 1-6 we 
report as a benchmark the “diamond” constructed using the average 
EMU parameters. 
Some features emerging from Figures 1-6 are worth noting. For 
instance, while the parameters of France and Germany are close to the 
EMU average (as expected, given that these two countries account for 
more than a half of EMU area in terms of GDP), the higher 
sustainability thresholds of France is explained almost exclusively by a 






Figure 1 – Sustainability parameters in 







Figure 2 – Sustainability parameters in 







Figure 3 – Sustainability parameters in 







Figure 4 – Sustainability parameters in 







Figure 5 – Sustainability parameters in 







Figure 6 – Sustainability parameters in 
the Netherlands and the EMU. 
Figures 1-6 – “Diamond” graphs of the parameters that affect the Keynesian sustainability indicator (ρ indicates the real 
interest rate). The parameters are scaled and measured in such a way that the sustainability thresholds increase with 
the distance from the origin of the axes. Each graph reports the average EMU parameters (dotted “diamond”). 
 On the contrary, the lower sustainability threshold of Italy 
depends on a capital share on output higher than the European 
average, even though the long-run real interest rate is lower and the tax 
ratio is higher in Italy than in the average EMU country. The 
unsustainability of the Belgian public debt is determined instead by a 
real interest rate above the European average, joined with an interest 
elasticity of money below the European average: these two parameters 
lead to a negative sustainability threshold even in the presence of the 
highest tax ratios among the country considered. 
4.3 The evolution of sustainability over time 
The thresholds in Table 1 are evaluated using sample averages 
over the last thirty years, taken as an approximation of the steady state 
(or lung-run) values of the corresponding parameters. However, most 
parameters entering the sustainability indicators have shown persistent 
variations over the last decades. It is therefore of some interest to 
observe how these shifts in the parameters have affected the 
















Figure 7 – The spread between the current value of the public debt/GDP 
ratio and the Keynesian sustainability threshold in some EMU member 
countries. Positive values indicate that public debt is above the 
sustainability threshold.  
As an illustration of this kind of analysis, consider Figure 7, 
reporting the spread between the current value of the public debt/GDP 
ratio and the Keynesian sustainability threshold (8) evaluated with the 
current values of r, τ, α and w. A positive spread indicates that the 
public debt is above its sustainable level. Figure 7 shows that in the 
first two years since the adoption of the Euro Italy has experienced 
sustainability problems; this applies especially to 2000, a year in which 
rising real interest rates determined a decrease in the sustainable level 
of public debt throughout the EMU. Since then the favourable evolution 
of the real interest rate has brought Italy below its sustainable 
threshold.   22
A similar analysis performed with the neoclassical indicator would 
show that the sustainability position of most countries deteriorated with 
the inception of EMU, mostly because of a fall in real growth rates.  
5.  Conclusions 
As stated above, the purposes of this paper were twofold: on the 
methodological side, it aimed at critically evaluating the solvency 
criterion, pioneered by Hamilton and Flavin (1986), which is nowadays 
almost hegemonic in the analysis of public debt sustainability, and at 
illustrating alternative measures of sustainability based on the dynamic 
stability approach originated by Domar (1944); on the applicative side, 
it looked at sustainability in EMU member countries, with particular 
attention given to the relations between sustainability and the design of 
fiscal rules. 
The alternative approach proposed and applied in this paper leads 
to the definition of a sustainability threshold for the public debt, and 
therefore measures how far from unsustainability a given country is, 
which the solvency approach does not; it allows us to cast the debate on 
sustainability in terms of meaningful economic parameters, which the 
solvency approach does not; in particular, it assesses the effectiveness of 
fiscal rules expressed in terms of government deficit/GDP ratio, which 
the solvency approach does not; finally, it allows us to examine the 
evolution of sustainability over time, which the solvency approach does 
not. 
While improving over the solvency criterion for the reasons listed 
above, the dynamic stability approach does not fully overcome some of 
its limitations.   23
First, the stability conditions are obviously model specific, as is 
the solvency criterion (which was recalled before to feature only in a 
well specified class of intertemporal models). On the one hand, this 
questions the general validity of the results obtained, although we have 
seen that some key parameters play quite similar roles in indicators 
stemming from very different models, thus mitigating the “model 
specificity” problem. On the other hand, however, the dynamic stability 
approach has, in our view, the merit of being intrinsically neutral, 
because it can be applied to models grounded on different economic 
theories, as shown in this paper. This does not apply to the solvency 
criterion. 
Secondly, the stability conditions are analytically manageable only 
in rather stylized dynamic models. This confines the empirical 
applications of the stability criterion to a relatively narrow class of 
economic models. In fact, using the words of Zee (1988, p. 669), the 
sustainability indicators should be seen only as “first order 
approximations of the margin between an economy’s existing debt level, 
and the level at which it can be sustained, given unchanged existing 
economic conditions”. The most relevant feature that the sustainability 
indicators fail to take into account is probably the impact of 
demographic evolution on the sustainability of fiscal policies. It should 
be stressed, however, that the same applies to the solvency tests. We 
believe in this respect that a reliable assessment of the sustainability of 
a country’s public debt can be carried out only within a full structural 
model of the economy, linked with a submodel representing the 
medium- to long-run demographic tendencies.   24
Keeping in mind these limitations, the indicators applied in this 
paper confirm the rather gloomy picture emerging from previous 
empirical analysis of sustainability in the EMU. In particular, the 
neoclassical indicator leads to more pessimistic results (in line with 
those of the earliest study based on the solvency constraint), while the 
Keynesian criterion finds sustainability in five out of the eight countries 
considered, as well as in the EMU area taken as a whole. 
The indicators, however, besides confirming (or refuting) the 
results of previous studies, give a number of other useful insights. For 
instance, both indicators point out that as far as sustainability is 
concerned, EMU member countries find themselves in very different 
positions from each other. This questions the validity of uniform deficit 
caps such as those envisaged by the SGP. More specifically, by applying 
the Keynesian criterion it was shown that a 3% deficit cap can in fact be 
justified as a sustainability requirement for an “average” EMU member 
country. At the same time, it was also shown that dispersion around 
this “average” is very large, and that as far as sustainability is 
concerned this ceiling is too low for the three major member countries 
(while being too permissive for other countries). In other words, if we 
believe that the Keynesian dynamic model provides a valid 
representation of the economic reality, we must conclude that the recent 
decision of France and Germany not to comply with the provisions of the 
SGP is unobjectable on sustainability grounds. 
As far as Italy is concerned, an application of the Keynesian 
criterion shows that its public debt is very close to the sustainability 
ceiling and even exceeded it in the first years if the EMU, as a 
consequence of the adverse evolution of the real interest rates. The   25
relatively low sustainability threshold of Italy was shown to depend on 
a relatively high capital share on income (hence a relatively low long-
run fiscal multiplier), in the presence of a real interest rate below, and a 
tax ratio above, the EMU average. Bringing the capital share on income 
in line with the EMU average would raise the sustainable level of debt 
to 280% of GDP. 
Finally, the purpose of this paper was obviously not that of saying 
an ultimate word on the topic, but rather that of pointing out that 
“another sustainability is possible”: beyond (and before) the 
intertemporally glamorous solvency constraint, there is a strand of 
literature which needs and deserves to be further pursued. 
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